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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between non-standard contracts (part-time, 
fixed-term) and workplace training by discussing the implications of two different theoretical 
frameworks grounding on human capital theory and strategic management, respectively. To achieve 
this purpose we develop alternative hypothesis on the association between the presence of non-
standard workers and four different outcome variables related to workplace training and job-related 
practices. By using data on Italian firms we get different results according to the type of non-
standard contract and training. Part-time and temporary contracts carry out distinct functions with 
respect to off-the job training as far as labour flexibility is concerned. On the other hand, although 
non-standard work seems to be unrelated to on-the-job training decisions, this is not the case when 
the overall number of job-related practices is taken into account. Overall, our evidence can reflect 
the decision to substitute off-the-job training with job-related practices in presence of part-time 
workers. Conversely, the recourse to temporary employment can be associated with the need to 
enhance systemic flexibility throughout the organization. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, in parallel with the acknowledgement of the increasing importance 
of training and human capital in fostering the goals of economic progress, and social integration, 
European countries have realized labour market reforms aiming at fostering the diffusion of flexible 
contracts as a mean to increase the employment rate. Italy has also entered this reform process. 
From the early nineties onwards extensive labour market reforms has been implemented, leading to 
a wider use of temporary and part-time contracts, and eventually to a two tier employment 
protection regime that relaxes regulation on the use of temporary contracts, while maintaining 
stringent employment protection rules for permanent contracts. This has led to the increase in the 
share of temporary and part-time work, which is a type of non-standard employment that is likely to 
be associated with unskilled jobs, low wages, and poor career perspectives (Connoly and Gregory, 
2008; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2011), while its 
effects on job and life satisfaction is quite puzzling (Booth and Van Ours, 2008). Moreover, it can 
be considered as temporary to the extent that employees are not willing to maintain this regime 
during their future working life (Barrett and Doyron, 2001).  
However, this transition may have negatively affected training decisions due to inferior incentives 
to invest in human capital attached to flexible contracts because of the limited expected payback 
period for that investment. For the same reason, precarious workers are inhibited to actively 
participate to training programs and achieve the expected learning outcomes.  
On the theoretical ground one can state that two distinct approaches have been developed for the 
analysis of the interactions between training and firms' requirement of flexibility. The first and 
dominant approach, at least in the domain of economics, is rooted in the human capital models and 
in their derivations and developments. The focus of these models is mainly on the conditions and 
the incentives which favour the financing of employees' training by the employer and/or by the 
employees themselves. In these models labour flexibility plays a key role as it affects the expected 
tenure of employees and, in this way, the time needed to pay back employers' investment in 
training. The second approach is based in the strategic management view of the firm. In this 
perspective, the firm is conceived as a complex system in which each personnel practice interacts 
with the others and can be understood only when one takes into account the cobweb of relationships 
among different practices. Accordingly, training practices interact with labour flexibility measures 
and this complex structuring affects the employers' choices.  
An extensive strand of empirical literature has explored the relationship between flexible contracts 
and training investments both in Europe and in Italy from the supply-side, using information on 
household and individual workers, while few studies have investigated this effect from the labour 
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demand standpoint, using data at firm level. Conversely, few studies have investigated this effect 
from the labour demand standpoint, using firm-level data, despite the fact that the key decision 
maker for firm personnel and training policy is the employer, who usually finance the relevant 
investment and may constrain workers in their training choices. Moreover most of these studies 
often nest together on-the-job and off-the-job training due to the unavailability of separate data. Yet, 
these two types of training are different in nature. We try to fill this gap with respect to the Italian 
context by estimating off-the-job and on-the-job training determinants through firm-level data. The 
presence of part-time and temporary workers represents the flexibility measures mentioned above 
and, therefore, the explanatory variables of our models. We are going to discuss these issues 
developing and testing a set of hypotheses stemming directly from these two theoretical approaches. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the increasing role of non-
standard employment in the Italian labour market. Section 3 reviews both theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between temporary work, part-time and training, with particular 
reference to the literature based on human capital. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework 
based on the strategic management approach. Section 5 discusses the different hypotheses about the 
relationships between training and flexibility, which can be worked out within the two distinct 
theoretical models. Section 6 presents the dataset and the descriptive statistics. Section 7 justified 
the econometric models. Section 7 shows and discusses the result. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Labour market reforms and non-standard employment in Italy 
Italy has been fully involved in this process. From the early nineties onwards extensive 
labour market reforms have been implemented. Further to the enactment of laws 196/1997, 
368/2001 and 30/2003, the pre-existing rules that had limited the use of fixed-term contracts were 
substantially relaxed. The same reforms allowed employment via manpower agencies, and 
introduced other types of non-standard contracts. The overall change was substantial: according to 
OECD (2004), Italy is the country that experienced the highest relaxation of legislation on 
temporary contracts between the late 1980s and 2003. This reformatory process led to a wider use 
of temporary and part-time contracts and eventually to the adoption of a two-tier employment 
protection regime. The share of fixed-term contracts rose from 10.2% to 13.4% of the employees 
between 1993 and 2011, while the share of part-time employees increased from 9.7% to 15.0% in 
the same period. The fact that most of part-time workers are women (27.9% of total female 
occupation in 2009) does not mean that this contractual form is always voluntary. Actually, the 
share of part-time female employees unwilling to stay in this condition has always been fairly high 
(around 35%) in the last decade, eventually rising to 55% in 2012. Notably, in most recent years the 
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growth of part-time work has only concerned the non-voluntary component which is typically 
penalized in terms of both wages (Barret and Doiron, 2001) and job satisfaction (Berton et al, 
2009). Currently, this percentage is much higher than the EU average (around 25% in 2012), despite 
the lower share of part-time contracts registered in Italy.  
In parallel, Italy has recorded a serious slowdown of labour productivity growth which has 
systemically lagged the average of EU-15. Comparing the periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999 and 2000-
2005, we notice that the yearly rate of growth of value added per hour worked was declining for 
Italy slowing from 1.55% to 0.31% from 1990-1994 to 1995-1999 and dropping to -0.07% in 2000-
2005. In the same periods the average data of EU-15 has decreased from 1.88% in 1990-1994 to 
0.98% in 2000-2005, meaning that the yearly relative gap with Italy augmented from 0.33% to 
1.05%. The same result is reached by comparing Italy with the other major European countries: 
Germany, France and United Kingdom. In most recent years Italian situation even worsened. In the 
period 2000-2012 total factor productivity in Italy has remained substantially stable, showing 
disappointing trajectories. One explanatory argument for this productivity drop has been the 
introduction of a flexible market regime not accompanied by institutions that provide workers with 
training during the transition phase from one job to another one (active labour policies). Flexible 
employment may undermine long-run economic performance if it is not associated with additional 
incentives or subsidies to training investments. Accordingly, labour market segmentation has been 
called to have a negative impact on training activity due to the higher job instability of non-standard 
workers. On the other hand, however, dual labour markets may stimulate a better coordination of 
the workforce and provide suitable institutional frameworks for the firms to maintain a proper 
balance between the different dimensions of flexibilities under the assumption that benefits will 
arise only if a systemic approach is taken.  
 
3. Training investments and non-standard workers in the human capital literature 
One of the main threats attached to flexible employment is that it can lead to firms’ 
underinvestment in human capital. According to the standard prediction of human capital theory a 
high-rate of non-standard contracts negatively affects employers’ attitude to provide specific 
training (Becker, 1964) as workers are expected to experience a relatively high turnover rate. This 
has economic consequences on firm’s behaviour. The expectation that employees will leave the 
workplace lowers the capability for the firms to capture most of the benefits accruing from training 
(Beckman, 2002). In turn, workers have a lower incentive to actively participate to training 
programs and achieve the expected learning outcomes. This argument applies in particular to 
temporary and involuntary part-time workers. Part-timers are also expected to receive less training 
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than their full-time counterparts since they have a shorter post-training period for enjoying the 
returns from training. 
In presence of imperfect labour markets (Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Acemoglu and Pischke, 
1999) this argument can be applied to general training as well. Market imperfections, such as 
monopsony power, asymmetric information, unions, mobility restrictions and minimum wages, 
create a wedge between the worker’s productivity inside the firm and his outside options. This 
wedge provides employers with incentives in investing in general training and is likely to increase 
in parallel with the workers’ skill level. A similar outcome is achieved in presence of a mixed 
training intervention that allows the firm to partially recapture its general training outlays thanks to 
the “hold up” problem arising from the simultaneous presence of specific skills (Kessler and 
Luelfesmann; 2006). The same occurs if technical complementarities between general and specific 
human capital (Brunello, 2001) and/or between training and innovation (Acemoglu, 1997) are 
assumed. The presence of complementary investments in general training thus generates a larger 
increase in productivity and better economic performance (Barrett and O’Connell, 2001; Dearden 
et. al., 2006) than separate investments in specific training. However, even under these approaches, 
substantial differences between general and specific training persist. In particular, the expected pay-
off of general training is usually higher in the long term rather than in the short term.  
According to this theoretical framework, fixed-duration and involuntary part-time workers 
are expected to experience a relatively high turnover rate, for firms it would be difficult to recoup 
training costs and provide incentives for an appropriate learning process for these workers. In turn, 
the firm’s return from training investments is negatively related to the probability that workers quit 
the firm, under the assumption that the effects of training on productivity comes out only at the end 
of the intervention. Thus, employers are supposed to reduce their training investments as long as the 
share of temporary and part-time workers is high. Eventually, these workers will achieve lower 
level of productivity than permanent ones due to the limited amount of training they receive. The 
aim of promoting flexibility may therefore be not compatible with the aim of improving workers’ 
skills in the workplace as the market is likely to end up with a high quit-low training equilibrium.  
Concerning empirical evidence, most of the existing studies support the view that workers 
with open-ended contracts are more likely to receive training than non-standard ones. Notably, 
assuming that both off-the-job and on-the job training are paid by employers (Booth and Bryan, 
2002; OECD, 2003) there is evidence of firms’ under-investment in training for both part-time and 
temporary employees. Oosterbeek (1996) finds that Dutch workers with permanent contracts have 
higher training probabilities than temporary workers. More recently, Fouarge et al. (2012) confirm 
these results, also reporting that, among workers that receive employer-funded training. Those who 
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have a non-standard contract are more likely to receive general training than permanent ones. 
Likewise, O’Connell and Byrne (2012) find that Irish temporary and part-time workers are 
moderately penalized with respect to general training, but part-time employees are more likely to 
receive specific training than full time ones. With respect to Britain, Arulampalam and Booth 
(1998) show that workers with temporary contracts are less likely to be trained in the workplace 
using household data, while Addison and Bielefeld (2004) find similar effects for part-time 
contracts employing firm-level data. These results are partially confirmed by Boheim and Booth 
(2004), but negative effects are limited to some categories of workers (female non-manual 
workers). Almeida-Santos and Mudford (2004) analyse the determinants of employer-provided 
training in Australia using workplace level information, finding out that both part-time and fixed 
term employees are less likely to be trained. Employing household data, Forrier and Sels (2003) 
find that Belgian permanent employees are more likely to receive employer-funded training than 
temporary employees. Similar findings are reported for Spain (Albert et al., 2005; Cabrales et al., 
2014) and Germany (Sauermann, 2006). These results are indirectly confirmed by another strand of 
literature that focuses on the (negative) impact of temporary employment on labour productivity 
(Dolado and Stucchi, 2008). Fewer studies report the absence of significant training penalties for 
temporary workers (Oosterbeek, 1998).  
Comparative analyses generally confirm the negative correlation between training 
opportunities and non-standard workers in European countries (Bassanini et al., 2005; European 
Commission, 2010; OECD, 2002). Yet, they show a statistically significant lower training 
probability for temporary and part-time workers with respect to a limited number of countries 
(Arulampalam et al., 20034; Albert et al., 20105), while the impact of apprentices has been related to 
the level of institutional support provided to this type of contract, which is higher in Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland than in Anglo-Saxon countries (Dustmann and Schonberg, 2012). However 
a negative correlation also emerges from the relationship between training incidence and the overall 
level of employment protection, suggesting that training investments are particularly poor in 
presence of a combination of high employment protection and a wide recourse to non-standard 
employment contracts. Overall, cross-country comparisons report that training levels mainly 
diverge for the different weights attached to worker and job characteristics rather than for the 
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 In particular, temporary male workers have a lower probability to be trained  in Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland 
and Spain (for the overall sample results are only significant for Danish workers), while part-time workers (both males 
and females) are less likely to be trained in Britain and Finland. 
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 In particular, temporary workers have a lower probability to receive training in Spain and Britain, while for part-time 
results are never significant. 
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different characteristics of workers and jobs between the selected countries (Leuven and 
Oosterbeek, 1999). 
However, most of these studies rely on supply-side information grounding on micro data on 
household and individual workers. Conversely, few studies have investigated this effect from the 
labour demand standpoint, using firm-level data, despite the fact that the decision whether to train 
or not rests mainly on the employer, who usually finance the relevant investment. Most of the 
existing analysis is therefore partially biased by the measurement error attached to the distance 
between employers’ and employees’ responses regarding the provision of informal training and the 
intensity of formal training.  
 
4.  Flexibility as a multidimensional concept  
The use of the notion of flexibility among economists has been quite unilateral in the standard 
economic literature and has not advanced further since Atkinson's (1985) discussion of three aspects 
of labour flexibility: a) numerical flexibility; b) wage flexibility and c) functional flexibility. One of 
the limits of this analysis of flexibility is that each of these aspects of flexibility is analysed 
separately, without taking into account how these three dimensions of labour flexibility can be 
interrelated through relationships of either trade-off or complementarity.  
A more thorough analysis of flexibility, which works out a complex framework of analysis based on 
a systemic view of the firm, can be found in the strategic management literature (Volberda, 1998). 
The starting point of Volberda's analysis is the recognition of the existence of a paradox of 
flexibility. The pursuit of flexibility in a firm can be achieved by the balance between two diverse 
kinds of capabilities. On the one hand there is the option of consolidating and exploiting the present 
productive practices and procedures (conservative flexibility) in order to maximise profits; on the 
other hand there is the option of reconceptualising and radically changing the norms, the paradigms 
and the cognitive structure on which the firm's operations are based in order to face drastic, and 
often unforeseen, business environment changes and to create new and unexplored business 
opportunities (innovative flexibility)6. There is a substantial difference between conservative and 
innovative flexibility. The former entails reactions and change well within the same productive 
paradigm, either through a more efficient implementation of existing practices and procedures or 
through the introduction of new ones without significant changes in distinct competences.  This is 
perfectly consistent with a tendency towards conservatism and ossification. The latter implies the 
abandonment of old practices and routines through the development of a new vision and conception 
of the business and the consequent introduction of new knowledge and experiences (Argyris and 
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Schon, 1978). In this case flexibility presupposes a thorough evolution of both the techno-
organisational framework and the capability to manage and control this radical process of change.  
The balance between these two different concepts of flexibility is a key to advance the firm's 
competitiveness. It is important to emphasise that the notion of a balance between innovative and 
conservative flexibility does not mean that these two forms of flexibility have to maintain a specific 
and constant ratio measured with some statistical indicator. The idea is that flexibility is made up by 
these two components and that the operation and the performance of a firm also depend on how 
these two components combine. However, there is not “one best combination” but simply different 
approaches characterised by the different relevance acknowledged to each form of flexibility. 
Certain firms can find it profitable to give priority to conservative flexibility, whereas others can 
prioritize innovative flexibility.  
Consistently with this framework of analysis, Volberda discusses all the different approaches and 
definitions of flexibility which can be found in the strategic management literature. As the paradox 
of flexibility refers to the tension between conservative and innovative flexibility, we can observe 
that flexibility is a multidimensional notion. Each dimension captures a specific aspect of flexibility 
and is complementary to the other dimensions. For our purposes it can be useful to introduce three 
notions of flexibility, each one corresponding to a specific dimension: a) internal and external 
flexibility; b) operational, organisational and strategic flexibility; and c) short-term, medium-term 
and long-term flexibility7.  
Each notion captures and defines flexibility according to a specific perspective and should be 
combined with the others. Hence, any measure aimed at reinforcing flexibility should be compared 
to each of these three dimensions, in order to properly assess its impact and to understand whether 
its target is either conservative or innovative. Therefore, the introduction of a specific measure can 
be considered as a tool to address a specific combination of these three dimensions of flexibility8.  
Moreover, what are really important to assess the policies for flexibility of a firm are not only the 
distinct measures considered individually, but also the interactions among the practices and their 
effects on the balance between conservative and innovative flexibility. This balance favours the 
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 Whereas dimensions sub b) and c) are quite well known, it is worth specifying the meaning of both internal and 
external flexibility. Internal flexibility refers to the capability of a firm to adapt and react to changes in the business 
environment but also to pre-empt and anticipate possible changes. External flexibility refers to the capability of firms to 
influence the external environment through either protective or offensive measures. For more details, see Volberda 
(1998). 
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 For example if the firm decides to hire temporary workers, this is a measure which affects internal flexibility because 
it increases the ability to react to changes in the level of demand (first dimension). Furthermore, this measure can be 
considered as a tool to reinforce operational flexibility, since it implies a change in the level of activity without any 
transformation in the organisational structure (second dimension) and, finally, a measure aimed at strengthening short-
term flexibility (third dimension). 
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continuity in productive activities and the preservation of core competences, without hampering the 
pursuit of the evolution of new ideas, the introduction of new practices, procedures and core 
competences and the turnover of obsolete or redundant competences. In this sense, flexibility is a 
systemic characteristic of a firm, which can be assessed only by taking into account the complex set 
of choices made by the management. If a sustainable balance is not reached and maintained the 
result could be either an increase in rigidity, if measures aimed at increasing conservative flexibility 
prevail, or chaos and disorder, if specific manoeuvres to foster innovative flexibility outweigh 
measures addressing conservative flexibility. The requirement to reach and keep such a balance can 
be met through a bundle of interventions.  
Conclusively, the target of these interventions affecting flexibility is twofold. On the one hand their 
goal can be simply to support and promote a specific dimension of flexibility. On the other hand 
their aim can be the preservation of the balance between innovative and conservative flexibility. 
Additionally, even though these dimensions of flexibility are distinct, complementarity 
relationships can be observed among them so that, when a certain measures is introduced, further 
interventions could be required in order to favour the viability (effectiveness) of this measure and to 
maintain the balance between conservative and innovative flexibility.  
This multidimensional concept of flexibility helps us to understand that the relationship between 
labour flexibility and training investments is not as straightforward and unidirectional as we could 
expect. The strategic management approach suggests that training decisions could be complemented 
by other interventions on labour flexibility in order to maintain the balance between conservative 
and innovative flexibility or to enhance the effectiveness of the measure itself or to minimise some 
undesired side effects. However, the two approaches are not alternative to one another, because 
their theoretical implications do not contradict each other. They provide two diverse perspectives 
for the analysis of the effects of interventions on labour flexibility. In Atkinson's approach a 
microeconomic perspective prevails and the unit of analysis is the single worker. The focus is on 
how each measure affects the three dimensions of flexibility and their interactions on the basis of 
the effects of each measure on the single worker. In the systemic approach the focus is on the 
relationships among different practices and their effects on workers. In conclusion, these two 
approaches can integrate one with the other so to provide a thorough analysis of the effects of 
interventions on labour flexibility.  
 
5.  Training, complementarity and flexibility 
Distinguishing between off-the-job and on-the-job training 
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Workplace training can be viewed as a dynamic process of specification of complementary 
relationships between skills and other inputs. The provision of different skills is therefore an 
important element in the economic analysis of training and its determinants, while training 
interventions accomplish different functions within the firm in coping with skill development 
among the workforce according to their composition in terms of methods and contents. Thus, in 
view of their different nature and purpose, training initiatives need to be distinguished according to 
their nature as long as the availability of data makes it feasible.  
The standard economic literature identifies two dichotomous types of training in relationship to the 
corresponding skills that are developed among employees: general and specific training. General 
training is defined in terms of transferability. The attached skills can be of use to both current and 
future employers. On the other hand, only the current employer can get benefits from specific 
training. Moreover, the provision of specific skills, together with the straight practical applications 
in the accomplishment of the job tasks, is expected to increase labour productivity more quickly, 
but also to shorten the pay-back period due to skills’ higher rate of obsolescence, particularly in 
presence of frequent technical changes. Both of them, however, are mainly financed by the 
employer (Evertsson, 2004; Fouarge et al., 2013).  
In parallel, training can be distinguished between off-the-job and on-the-job training. Off-the-job 
training is undertaken away from the work position and includes both the formal component of 
internal training such as dedicated courses, and the whole external training. Internal courses mainly 
deal with technical contents that can be considered as either industry-specific or firm-specific. On 
the other hand, although it is not possible to exactly separate the general component from the 
specific one in each training intervention, we can assume that external courses are more likely 
aimed at developing general skills. Therefore, we can claim that off-the-job training can be referred 
to both general and specific skills. These skills however are not equally distributed. According to 
existing studies general training usually prevail (Booth and Bryan, 2002; O’Connell and Byrne, 
2012).  
On the other hand, on-the-job training takes place during working hours, very often in informal 
way, and is expected to be primarily specific. The range of on-the-job training is rather wide. It 
includes the learning of sophisticated techniques, developed in-house, but also the acquiring of 
specific knowledge related to menial tasks (e.g. the use of a photocopy machine). For its nature the 
incidence and intensity of on-the-job training are severely affected by the rate of obsolescence of 
specific skills. On-the-job training can be, however, quite informal, not systematic and difficult to 
measure and to monitor. Such characteristics can hamper the possibility to measure its actual 
intensity and bring about an underestimation of its effects on labour productivity (Nordman and 
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Hayward, 2006). For this reason in most of the empirical studies on-the-job training is usually 
measured through a binary variable attached to the propensity to train rather than a continuous or 
discrete variable associated with training intensity.  
Because of its nature, on-the-job training can be also associated with the presence of job-related 
practices, such as quality circles, job rotation and team working. Accordingly, the effect on on-the-
job training on productivity also depends on its complementary relationships among different job-
related practices in favouring the process of skill development. Together with on-the-job training, 
these practices mainly contribute to develop idiosyncratic technical skills. It has been shown, 
indeed, that there are positive complementarities between different workforce development 
practices in determining the overall effect of personnel policies, and that it is the overall bundle of 
practices that is important rather than the adoption of individual practices (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski et al, 1997).  
 
The relationship between training and flexibility 
By keeping this in mind, we can further investigate the relationship between training and flexibility. 
If we simply refer to Atkinson's notion of flexibility, one can be tempted to claim the existence of a 
trade-off between numerical flexibility and employers' propensity to training; i.e.: the higher the 
employees' attachment to the workplace the higher the employer's propensity to provide training for 
her employees. This trade-off underpins the relationship between numerical and functional 
flexibility: the lower the degree of numerical flexibility the greater the employer's propensity to 
provide training and, as a result, the greater the degree of functional flexibility. Functional 
flexibility requires an unspecified amount of training and can be fostered only when expected tenure 
of employees is quite high. Substantially, this was the institutionalist position in the 80s (Piore, 
1986).  
Atkinson's approach focuses only on the direct effects that the personnel practices directed to 
reinforcing flexibility have on workers. According to this approach, those workers who favour the 
strengthening of numerical flexibility (for instance, temps) do not provide functional flexibility, 
directly. The expected short-term attachment of these workers to the firm does not make it 
rewarding the provision of training for them. However, if one considers how the measures directed 
to reinforce flexibility interact with other personnel practices and/or firm's strategies, things can be 
different. In this case the focus is not only on the direct effects of the introduction of a single 
personnel practice on workers, but also on the interaction among different practices. Notably, while 
an intervention aimed at increasing numerical flexibility is expected to have a direct negative effect 
on the propensity to provide training to the employees directly involved in this measure, this 
12 
measure can interact with other practices, favouring the provision of training to the employees as a 
whole9. Especially, if one considers a segmented internal labour market, where a contingent 
workforce coexists with a segment of employees with a long-term tenure, one can observe that an 
increase in numerical flexibility, reached through an increase in the incidence of temporary 
workers, can be consistent with an increase in the amount of training for the stable component of 
the workforce. In this way the two components of the workforce serve two distinct but 
complementary targets; the contingent segment provides numerical flexibility, whereas the stable 
tier of the workforce points to the enhancement of functional flexibility (or operational flexibility, 
using Volberda's terminology) through the acquisition of new skills. In this case the provision of 
training to the stable workforce can increase the cost of lay-offs and has to be balanced by an 
increase in the pool of contingent employees, in order to restore numerical flexibility.  
In the case just outlined flexibility is reached by applying different strategies to different segments 
of the internal labour market. Yet, this is not the only scenario in which the furthering of functional 
flexibility occurs without hampering numerical flexibility. An employer can conceive to design job 
posts, so that these require a minimum amount of on-the-job training and a high degree of general 
training. If this is technologically feasible, general training substitutes for on-the-job training, and 
favours the advancement of functional flexibility. On the other hand, a minimum amount of 
investments in on-the-job training implies that these job positions can be assigned to workers with 
temporary contracts, which can be easily terminated10. Using Atkinson's terminology, one can claim 
that in this way functional flexibility along with numerical flexibility have been strengthened. 
Finally, in the systemic approach to the analysis of the relationship between training and flexibility, 
the idea of complementarity plays a key role. Accordingly, as a further application of the relevance 
of this notion, we claim that complementarity among different job-related practices plays a pivotal 
role when one also wants to assess the quality of training. Similarly, variety in training contents can 
be conceived as an attempt to exploit complementarity relationships among different skills. The 
idea is that, under the assumption of complementarity, the higher the variety among training 
contents, the higher the potential use of skills developed through training. For this reason variety is 
an indicator of the relevance acknowledged to the implementation of training practices for the 
pursuit of competitiveness and can be considered as an indicator of the quality of training.  
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 With reference to the evolution of the role played by temporary work agencies Osterman, Burton (2006) claim “ […] 
what is striking about these firms is the new roles they are playing. They have penetrated into a wide range of 
occupations, and they play an important role in many firms’ recruiting and training strategies.” 
10
 This is not the only strategy suitable to reinforce both functional and numerical flexibility. To accomplish this end a 
firm could also decide to contract out some specific productive phases. This would be an alternative strategy to design a 
job post requiring high skills and poor investment in specific training.  
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Hypotheses  
Following our theoretical reasoning we proceed to formulate the hypotheses to be tested in the 
subsequent empirical analysis. Namely, we formulate four sets of hypotheses. Each of them consists 
of two different statements: the first statement is related to the standard economic approach, 
whereas the second statement derives from the systemic approach to the analysis of the firm and its 
training practices. However, it is important to underline that each statement does not rule out the 
other one. 
First, we can expect a lower provision of off-the-job training in presence of non-standard workers. 
A higher job instability would lead to a shorter expected duration for the firm to recover training 
investments. Ceteris paribus, this would lead to a lower intensity of off-the-job training at firm 
level. Similarly, when considering the effect of a single intervention on numerical flexibility a 
trade-off between numerical flexibility and provision of training is expected to prevail.  
 
Hypothesis 1a 
The recourse to non-standard employment is negatively associated with off-the-job training 
intensity. (Human capital approach) 
 
However, once taking into account the different dimensions of flexibility, and considering the firm 
as a cobweb of interconnected organisational arrangements, one can claim that training practices 
and the interventions to intensify the numerical flexibility are complementary and can reinforce 
each other.  
 
Hypothesis 1b 
Overall, off-the-job training intensity is positively associated with the presence of non-standard 
workers. (Flexibility approach)  
 
Second, with reference to on-the-job training, if we consider a simple two-period model we can 
claim that the firm's propensity to provide on-the-job training depends on the time distribution of 
benefits accruing to the firm. If the firm manages to concentrate the benefits in the initial period, 
then the presence of non-standard workers is not likely to affect the employers' training decisions. 
Moreover, in cases where specific skills are characterised by a high rate of obsolescence, on-the-job 
training has to be provided to all workers regardless their attachment to the firm.  
 
Hypothesis 2a 
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The recourse to non-standard employment is not associated with the propensity to invest in on-the-
job training (Human capital approach).  
 
On the other hand, for the same reasons as those outlined for off-the-job training, one can assert that 
on-the-job training and numerical flexibility can be positively associated. This argument is 
reinforced if on-the-job training and off-the-job training are complementary. Moreover, as stated in 
paragraph 4, the employer can adopt a job design strategy aimed at minimising on-the-job training 
by substituting it with off-the-job training. Accordingly, the propensity to provide on-the-job 
training is expected to be negatively related to the presence of skilled workers. As outlined in the 
previous paragraph, in this case one can observe the strengthening of both functional and numerical 
flexibility at the same time.  
 
Hypothesis 2b 
The recourse to non-standard employment is positively associated with both the propensity to invest 
in on-the-job training and the presence of unskilled workers. (Flexibility approach)  
 
Finally, when discussing the association between the quality of training, as measured in terms of 
variety of training contents and job-related practices, and the recourse to non-standard workers we 
can argue that the relationship between the quality of training and the presence of non-standard 
workers should be consistent with the results of the tests on Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
 
Hypothesis 3a  
Training variety is negatively associated with the presence of non-standard contracts (Human 
Capital approach). 
 
Hypothesis 3b 
Training variety is positively associated with the presence of non-standard contracts (Flexibility 
approach). 
 
Hypothesis 4a 
The number of job-related practices is not associated with the presence of non-standard contracts  
(Human Capital approach). 
 
Hypothesis 4b 
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The number of job-related practices is positively associated with the presence of non-standard 
contracts. (Flexibility approach). 
 
6. Dataset and descriptive statistics 
For our empirical analysis we use data coming from the Survey on employee training in 
Italian firms performed by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2006 (reference year 
2005), whose microdata have been released in 2012. These data allow us to distinguish off-the-job 
from on-the-job training, and to disentangle non-standard workforce between part-time, apprentices 
and temporary workforce. Data also provide different proxies of off-the-job training intensity: 
hours/days of training per employee, the number (or the proportion) of trained employees, training 
costs, and the content of training activity. The sample includes 15,470 firms employing more than 
10 workers. Among them 6,439 (41.6%) have provided some kind of off-the-job firm-sponsored 
training in 2005 (either internal or external), 2,533 (16.3%) have provided on-the-job training 
activities (defined as a scheduled period of training, learning or practical experience to be carried 
out on the site or in the work situation), 2,128 (14.55%) have provided both, meaning that 88.9% of 
on-the-job training firms also provides off-the-job training. Overall 43.45% of the firms report that 
they are engaged in some form of training activity, while the average number of employees of 
training firms is approximately twice larger than the overall mean.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on training incidence and intensity, and employment structure. 
Results are disaggregated according to the type of training and the presence of different type of 
flexible workers. The participation to training activities only involves a minority of the workforce 
of training firms: the share of workers that participate in training activities is 40.75% for off-the-job 
training and 29.03% for on-the-job-training. Off-the-job training intensity is low as well, on 
average. It amounts to 11.6 hours per employee per year, while training costs amount to 576 Euro 
per employee per year. In terms of contents, off-the-job training can be considered as mostly 
general, as expected. Almost the totality of off-the-job training firms develops some kind of general 
skills (96%), while specific contents are provided by 62% of the sample. General training prevails 
in terms of intensity as well: on average, only 4.8 hours per employee can be considered as general, 
while general contents count for more than 9 hours per employee.  
The survey also reports the diffusion of those job-related practices that are intrinsically 
related to training activities. These practices are represented by “quality circles”, “self-learning” and 
“job rotation”. Overall, the share of firms offering such practices is quite low: 7.81% for job 
rotation, 3.98% for self-learning, and 2.98% for quality circles. This percentage is actually poor and 
reflects the low propensity of Italian firms to activate innovative bundles of working practices in 
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their plants. In relation to workforce characteristics, descriptive statistics show that most of the 
training firms employ non-standard workers. Overall, 68.81% and 59.91% of these firms include 
part-time and temporary workers in their workforce respectively. In approximately half of the cases 
they employ both types of workers, while 20.26% of the interviewed firms do not employ any of 
them. Few firms, however, offer training interventions that are specifically targeted for these types 
of workers (3.47% for part-time workers and 7.81% for temporary workers). The recourse to 
apprenticeship contracts is scarcer: 41.72% of the firms employ at least one apprentice (this 
percentage raise to 42.30% in the subsample of training firms). Finally, we find that 36.72% of the 
training firms have at least one immigrant among their employees, while unskilled workers are 
present in 30.79% of the firms.  
 
<Table 1a> 
 
<Table 1b> 
 
The existence of a correlation between off-the-job and on-the-job training is supported by the 
analysis of Pearson coefficients which show a substantial positive relationship between these two 
categories of training (0.42). Other correlation coefficients are reported in Table 2. As expected, the 
correlation between training variables is positive, although in the majority of the case the magnitude 
is poor. Some overlap only emerges between the propensity to provide on-the-job training and the 
presence of at least one job-related practice. Thus it is meaningful to jointly analyse on-the-job 
training and job-related practices when estimating their determinants. 
 
<Table 2>  
 
The positive complementarity between the two types of training is confirmed by the results of a 
biprobit estimate that uses off-the-job and on-the-job propensity as dependent variables (Table 3). 
Artrho coefficient is highly positive and significant. Moreover, most characteristics influence off-
the-job and on-the-job training in the same way (except for some industrial sector that only 
increases the probability to provide off-the-job training, such as finance and constructions). This is 
also true for the diffusion of job-related practices, which positively influences both types of 
training. On a reversed perspective, this result may also suggest that job-related practices require 
both types of training in order to be activated.  
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<Table 3>  
 
7. The econometric models 
In order to estimate the determinants of training, we estimate two econometric models where 
training propensity and intensity are seen as a function of the diffusion of non-standard contracts in 
the firm. Training propensity is a binary variable that takes the value one if the firm has provided 
training in 2005 and zero otherwise. To measure off-the-job training intensity our decision is to use 
the length of courses expressed in hours per year per employee. We exclude training costs because, 
if the aim is the comparability among different firms, training cost is an ambiguous variable. Each 
firm takes into account different components in assessing training costs, thus hampering the 
comparability among different firms. Training costs are instead considered as a control variable as 
they represent the price of training for the firms. On the other hand, to measure the diffusion of 
temporary and part-time workers, we use two dummy variables taking the value of unity if the firm 
employs either temporary or part-time contracts, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
In specifying the econometric model for estimating the determinants of training intensity, we 
have to control for potential selection effects deriving from the observation of the dependent 
variable only for firms providing training in 2005. For this reason OLS estimate would suffer of a 
sample selection because training intensity is only observed if the firm decides to provide at least 
one training course. One of the standard estimation procedures for treating this selection problem is 
the two-step method proposed by Heckman (1979). However, this method is acceptable only if the 
dataset contain variables that can be used to identify the sample selection term. In absence of 
appropriate exclusion restrictions a multicollinearity problem is likely to arise (Puhani, 2000). Since 
the variables available in our dataset can not address this issue we decide to use a subsample OLS 
estimate for determining the effects of the presence of non-standard workers on off-the-job training 
intensity. Results are then controlled through a Tobit estimate by constructing a zero bounded 
dependent variable that takes the value of zero if the firm does not provide any training during the 
observed period. 
The second model estimates the probability of investing in on-the-job training, conditioned 
on the provision of off-the-job training, as a function of the same covariates. Analogously to the 
previous model we face a selection bias arising from the censoring of the observations on the 
presence of flexible workers. However, in this case, the dataset contains two potential exclusion 
restrictions: working hours per employees and the amount of compulsory social contributions paid 
to the State for financing vocational training. These variables are likely to affect only the firms’ 
decision to provide off-the-job training without influencing on-the-job training incidence. On-the-
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job training is carried on during working hours and does not enter in the computation of social 
contributions. This theoretical insight is supported by a test on the relationship of these variables 
with the outcome variable (off-the-job training hours per year per employee) that exclude their 
direct influence on the main equation. Accordingly, we use a Probit model with sample selection 
(heckprobit) where the selection equation is a Probit equation on the probability of providing off-
the-job-training. Additionally, we control for selection in observables using propensity score 
matching technique (PSM) for three treatment variables: the presence of temporary, part-time and 
unskilled workers. In this way, after checking that the common support condition is satisfied across 
more than 95% of treatment and comparison groups, we create matched “treatment” and “control” 
samples being identical in every other observable respect11. In particular, when using the presence 
of unskilled workers as the treatment variable, the common support condition is properly satisfied 
for the entire range of the observations while some treated firms have lots of close neighbours and 
others only have one. Accordingly, in the analysis of the effects of the presence of unskilled 
workers we decide to use the kernel matching procedure in view of its capability to maximize 
precision without worsening bias, while nearest neighbours technique is used as a robustness check. 
If matching is sufficiently good, differences in the propensity to provide on-the-job training can be 
used as estimates of the effect of employing either non-standard or unskilled workers on this 
outcome variable. (Garrido et al., 2014).  
Then we proceed to estimate the relationship between the presence of non-standard workers and the 
variety of training contents. In order to estimate this relationship we build a synthetic index of 
variety (ginicont) that measure the degree of variety of training contents provided by the firms in 
the sample ranging from 0 (equidistribution) to 1 (concentration). Once constructed we use this 
indicator as the dependent variable of a subsampled OLS regression that includes the same set of 
explanatory variables of the previous estimations. In this way we determine the effects of non-
standard contracts on the degree of variety of the contents provided to the workers through off-the-
job training interventions. 
Finally, in order we estimate the probability to activate a bundle of complementary job-related 
activities, we associate on-the-job training with job-related practices by counting the number of 
practices that are simultaneously reported by the firms in the sample. The dependent variable is 
discrete and takes non-negative values ranging from zero (no work-related practice) to five (all 
work-related practices). In order to choice the appropriate count data estimator we preliminary need 
to assess the degree of overdispersion and the excess of zeros. Given the low level of the variance-
mean ratio, and the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of equidispersion using the LM test 
                                                 
11
 Results of the distribution of propensity scores across treatment and comparison groups are available on request.  
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suggested by Cameron, Trivedi (2013), the former issue does not impede the use of a Poisson 
regression. On the contrary, we need to allow that the function generating the zero observation (no 
work-related practices) differ from the one associated with positive observations and thus deal with 
the "excess zeros" problem. The zero-inflated model addresses this issue by supplementing the base 
model with a binary process, in our case a probit model, that explain the excess of probability of 
having zero work-related practices. 
In all the models we introduce control variables related to several workplace characteristics at firm 
level that have been commonly found as determinants of training propensity and intensity: size, 
employment structure, innovation propensity, industry dummies (“other industries” is the 
benchmark), trade union recognition, and the organization of training activity. Employment 
structure includes the following variables measured as a ratio of total workers: women, young 
workers (<24 years old), managers. Training organization includes the following dummy variables: 
the presence of a training department and a person in charge for training; the adoption of training 
evaluation procedures based on workers’ satisfaction, learning achievements, and performance; the 
adoption of a training plan; the existence of a training budget; a formal role of trade unions in 
influencing firm’s training investments and the presence of firm-level contract clauses dealing with 
training interventions. Rationale for this selection is supported by both theoretical and empirical 
literature. Large firms may be better able to bear the risk associated with investments in general 
training (Goux, Maurin, 2000) while achieving economies of scale in the provision of specific 
training (O’Connell, 2007), and are more likely to report the presence of temporary and/or part-time 
worker in their workforce. Gender and age may affect the employer’s willingness to train as well as 
training intensity. In particular women are less-likely be offered formal on-the-job training than 
men (Evertsson, 2004), while older workers are less likely to be offered job-related training due to 
their lower expected payoff (Gelderblom and de Koning, 2006). On the contrary, the younger the 
worker, the higher the expected return from training, both for the firm and the individual. The 
propensity to innovate is also expected to be positively related to training and other job-related 
practices (Gashi et al., 2010). In line with our theoretical framework, a positive relationship 
between the adoption of job-related practices and training intensity is assumed to be in place 
(Whitfield, 2000). Finally, the role of trade unions and firm-level contract clauses in the training 
decision-making process are also expected to be associated with increased training intensity (Green 
et al., 1999; Groot, 1999) as well as all variables concerning training organization and evaluation 
procedures (O’Connell, 2007).  
 
8. Results 
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In this section we discuss our empirical evidence by separately testing the hypotheses worked out in 
the previous paragraph.  
 
Off-the-job training 
In tables 4 and 5 one can observe that the diffusion of non-standard employment has divergent 
effects on off-the-job training according to the type of contract. In all specifications, the presence of 
part-time contracts negatively affects the intensity of off-the-job training financed by the employer. 
In particular the presence of part-time workers lowers training intensity by 9% on average. This 
percentage is higher if we control for the adoption of job-related practices (second specification), 
which are usually deemed as complementary to off-the-job training, and positively associated with 
training investments. On the contrary, controlling for variables related to training organization and 
incentive contracts contributes to a drop of the penalty, meaning that firms employing part-time 
workers are also characterized by a less formalized organization of training activities. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of a wide set of controls and substantially confirmed by Tobit estimates, 
although the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients are slightly lower using this second 
technique. Overall, this evidence confirms the Human capital hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a); the 
recourse to part-time contracts is detrimental for off-the-job training intensity in Italy. 
Conversely the effect of the presence of temporary workers on training investments is positive at a 
first glance. Firms employing temporary workers provide on average 7% less training than those 
firms that do not employ this type of workers. However, the level of significance is acceptable only 
in the first specification, and is not significant at all according to Tobit estimates. Therefore, there is 
no substantial evidence that the presence of temporary contracts induce employers to reduce the 
intensity of off-the-job training. Basically, neither the hypothesis 1a nor the hypothesis 1b is 
supported by strong empirical evidence. This might suggest that the two effects at the basis of the 
two hypotheses coexist and cancel each other out.  
Concerning control variables, the second and third specifications show the effects of job-related 
practices, organization of training activities, and internal industrial relations on off-the-job training 
intensity. Job-related practices have a positive impact, which is in line with the hypothesis that there 
is strong complementarity between these organizational practices and off-the-job training 
investments. This is consistent with the idea that the human capital approach is not sufficient to 
explain firms’ investments in general training. The organization of the office in charge for training 
activity (presence of a plan and a budget) also has positive effects on training intensity, while the 
evaluation of training activity is found to be positive only if the outcome indicators refers to 
worker’s satisfaction and learning achievements. The last set of variables concern the explicit role 
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of contract clauses and trade unions in stimulating off-the-job training. Their effect is not significant 
or slightly negative, respectively, and reflects the union resistance to the introduction of 
technological and organizational innovations that may reduce firm’s labour demand, at least in the 
short run. 
 
<Table 4>  
 
<Table 5>  
 
On-the-job training 
Different results emerge from the estimate of the probability to provide on-the-job training adjusted 
for sample selection bias (Table 6). In all specifications the presence of part-time or temporary 
workers does not significantly affect the willingness to provide on-the-job-training. This is 
confirmed by the non-significant effect (ATT) of these variables when they are used as treatment 
variables in a PSM estimate using the same covariates of the first specification12 (Table 7). This is 
in line with a scenario in which the firm manages to concentrate the benefits in the initial period 
(Hypothesis 2a).  
Results also partially supports the hypothesis 2b. The coefficient related to unskilled workers is 
positive and significant in the first specification. On average an increase of the presence of unskilled 
workers increases the probability to train by 4%. This evidence is compatible with the double nature 
of on-the-job training, which, on the one hand, plays a relevant role in the process of skill formation 
for low-skilled workers and, on the other hand, simply facilitates the match between job posts and 
highly skilled workers. This result is supported by the PSM estimate using the presence of unskilled 
contracts as the treatment variable (Table 7). The ATT coefficient is very similar to those presented 
before and even more significant. Accordingly, PSM confirms a positive and significant effect of 
employing  unskilled workers on the propensity to provide on-the-job training. To assess the quality 
of the matching, Table 8 presents the differences between the mean values of a subset of the 
covariates which are used to match the treatment and control groups. Overall, our treatment and 
comparisons appear to be rather similar after the matching, with no significant statistical differences 
in the means of the reported values. The statistical results are alike when we repeat the estimates 
using the nearest neighbour procedure.  
                                                 
12
 Although the balancing for individual covariates across this two groups is not always fulfilled, the imbalance for the 
covariate is always limited to one block of propensity scores out of five. Detailed results are available on request. 
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Differences with off-the-job training also emerge from industrial dummies which reflect the 
different weight of specific skills attached to the job posts created in each industry. Notably, 
financial sector has a negative impact on training propensity, thus showing an opposite sign with 
respect to off-the-job training. This is not surprising in the light of the characteristic of the demand 
for skills in this industry, which is basically oriented towards soft and transversal skills. Finally, the 
size effect is positive and higher than the one reported in the off-the-job selection equation, and 
suggests the existence of greater dimensional threshold attached to on-the-job training because of 
the higher fixed costs that they entail. Finally, when introducing the role of firm-level bargaining 
process and trade unions, we find that the presence of contract clauses dealing with formal training 
negatively affects the propensity to train, while and the involvement of trade unions is not 
significant. This may reflect that in presence of such contract clauses firms tend to concentrate their 
training efforts in off-the-job training, thus reducing the probability to activate on-the-job training 
programs.  
 
<Table 6>  
 
<Table 7>  
 
<Table 8>  
 
Training variety 
Table 9 reports the  results on the relationship between training variety and the presence of non-
standard contracts, which are partially in line with our hypotheses. Actually, temporary workers 
positively affects the provision of differentiated contents, whereas part-time does not influence the 
variety of off-the-job training practices, as the sign of the coefficient is negative but statistically 
non-significant. This seems to confirm the different impact that these two distinct personnel 
practices have on training policies.  Conclusively, one can state that the hypothesis 3b is partially 
confirmed and that training variety is positively associated with the use of temporary labour 
contracts, but it is not affected by the presence of part-time.  
 
<Table 9>  
 
Job-related practices 
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Finally, we introduce a further variable (agg_jbp) that counts the number of job-related practices 
activated by the firms in the sample and proceed to estimate the impact of employment 
characteristics on this variable through a zero-inflated Poisson regression as described in Section 5 
(Table 10). Results show that the number of job-related practices increase by 13% in presence of 
part-time workers. This is in line with the prediction that those activities generating a positive return 
in the short term are not penalized by the presence of flexible workers. Conversely, temporary 
contracts are not significant at all. Accordingly, the coefficients calculated for part-time are 
consistent with the hypothesis 4b, whereas as far as the presence of temporary workers is concerned 
the evidence shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis 4a, as the coefficients are not significantly 
different from 0. Quite interestingly, we find that the variety of job-related practices is positively 
associated to the presence of unskilled workers. If one considers that these practices can also be 
used to provide informal training, this result can also be viewed as a further confirm of the existence 
of a positive association between the use of unskilled workers and specific training.  
 
<Table 10>  
 
9. Conclusions 
This paper explores the relationship between the presence of non-standard workers and training 
investments in Italian firms. Italy has been facing a productivity slowdown during the last decade 
and it is therefore important to analyse the different determinants of firm’s financed process of 
human capital accumulation. Non-standard employment is an issue in this respect, as the presence 
of flexible workers may affect training incidence, intensity, and quality. This issue has been 
addressed, among the others, by the human capital literature and the strategic management 
approach. Moreover, this effect may differ according to the type of training that is provided by the 
employer. Accordingly, by separately referring to off-the-job training, on-the-job training and job-
related practices, we look at the relationship between the presence of non-standard contracts and 
training investments under these two different theoretical perspectives.  
Our cross-sectional database on workplace training in Italian firms allows us to explore these issues. 
Specifically, the availability of several measures of training activity allows us to distinguish the 
different components of the relationship between the type of contract held by workers and the 
amount of training provided in the workplace. Thus we present econometric results for both on-the-
job and off-the-job training by using several outcome variables: firms’ propensity to train, training 
intensity, training variety, the simultaneous recourse to job-related practices.  For each econometric 
model we report results using different specifications. In our broader specification we consider (in 
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addition to “non-standard contracts” indicator) a wide set of controls including industry, size, 
workforce composition, and training organization.  
The main empirical findings show different results according to the type of non-standard contract 
and training. With reference to the presence of part-time workers the evidence supports our basic 
hypotheses, namely the existence of a negative relationship between non-standard contracts and 
training at the workplace. The unambiguous negative association between part-time and training 
intensity seems to be consistent with the idea that part-time is mainly used to control numerical 
flexibility. Accordingly the rationale behind their hiring seems to be merely quantitative, whereas 
the argument that the recourse to this type of contracts should be accompanied by the provision of 
new skills to the stable tier of the workforce is not supported.  On the contrary, results for temporary 
contracts are partially different. Their presence seems to correspond to a twofold function of fixed-
term contracts in the pursuit of productivity enhancements. On the one hand, they are aimed at 
reinforcing the numerical flexibility of the firms. On the other hand, they can be seen as a tool for 
complementing the promotion of functional flexibility obtained through an increase of training 
interventions for the stable tier of the workforce. This role in developing a bundle of different skills 
is confirmed by the positive association of temporary employment with training variety. Thus, the 
recourse to temporary workers can be viewed as a tool a complementarity between different types 
of flexibility. This does not mean, however, that this category of workers would benefit of a higher 
amount of training.    
With regard to on-the-job training, our basic result is twofold. First, non-standard contracts do not 
significantly influence firms’ choice to provide on-the-job training to their workers in line with 
human capital theory. Second, on-the-job training is positively related to the presence of part-time 
workers when interacting with other job-related practices, while this is not the case for temporary 
employees. This evidence can reflect the decision to substitute off-the-job training with on-the-job 
training and job-related practices in presence of part-time workers in order to shorten the pay-back 
period of the investments in human capital development. Thus, the idea that the recourse to part-
time employment is used to promote complementarity is not fully supported. Moreover, in the light 
of the negative relationship between part-time employment and off-the-job training intensity, the 
presence of part-time workers could inhibit the optimal combination between off-the-job and on-
the-job training.  
Finally, from the worker’s perspective, training is more likely to exacerbate rather than mitigate 
existing labour market inequalities. In particular, for part-time workers, the substitution between 
different types of training can be harmful for his/her career path because the productivity 
differential attached to on-the-job training interventions can be only enjoyed within the firm. In 
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parallel, employees’ motivation to learn from training could be negatively affected as well. This 
accentuates the importance of the transition probability to a full-time contract with the same 
employer. Accordingly, if part-time contract is either voluntary or a “stepping stone” workers will 
benefit of the skills acquired thanks to the intervention, otherwise, if it is a “dead end”, they will 
suffer a net loss from the participation in on-the-job training.  
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Table 1a – Descriptive statistics: quantitative variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Employment structure    
Number of employees  15,470 135.9729 85.4404 
Number of employees (training firms) 6,721 262.239 1280.129 
Proportion of males  15,470 0.7104 0.2621 
Proportion of males (training firms) 6,721 0.7136 0.2385 
Proportion of young workers 15,470 0.0631 0.0984 
Proportion of young workers (training firms) 6,721 0.0605 0.0901 
Proportion of old workers 15,470 0.0747 0.0890 
Proportion of old workers (training firms)  6,721 0.0705 0.0799 
Number of  apprentices 15,470 2.7828 22.5003 
Number of  apprentices (training firms) 6,721 4.2757 31.6968 
Quantity of labour used in the production process    
Yearly working hours per employee 15,470 1,592 312.7367 
Yearly working hours per employee (training firms) 6,721 1,612 286.5265 
Labour costs    
Labour cost per employee (€)  15,470 31,391 14,325 
Labour cost per employee (€) (training firms) 6,721 36,544 16,318 
Labour costs per hour (€) 15,470 19.980 9.2432 
Labour costs per hour (€)(training firms) 6,721 23.027 10.7356 
Training    
Off-the-job training (hours per employee)  5,986 11.667 17.6437 
Off-the-job general training (hours per employee) 5,747 9.046 14.5621 
Off-the-job specific training (hours per employee) 3,715 4.806 9.6441 
External off-the-job training (hours per employee) 5,239 7.261 12.4184 
Internal off-the-job training (hours per employee) 3,486 9.121 15.7799 
Off-the-job training cost per employee (€) 5,986 576.918 880.6824 
Off-the-job training direct cost per employee (€) 5,986 276.4628 492.4264 
Off-the-job training opportunity cost per employee (€) 5,986 300.4551 504.6698 
Off-the-job participation rate 6,439 40.75% 0.3661 
On-the-job participation rate 2,533 29.03% 0.2862 
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Table1b– Descriptive statistics: binary variables 
Variable 
Absolute 
frequencies Percentage 
Training propensity   
Off-the-job training (including external conferences)  6,439 41.62 
On-the-job training  2,533 16.37 
At least one type of  training  6,721 43.45 
Both types of  training 2,251 14.55 
Type of Workers (only firms providing off-the-job training)   
Presence of immigrants 2,177 36.37 
Dedicated training for  immigrants  94 4.32 
Presence of unskilled workers 1,843 30.79 
Dedicated training for  unskilled workers  237 12.86 
Presence of temporary workers 3,586 59.91 
Dedicated training for  temporary workers  280 7.81 
Presence of part-time workers  4,119 68.81 
Dedicated training for  part-time workers  143 3.47 
Organization   
Training department 2,619 38.21 
Training responsible 4,258 62.12 
Training plan 3,786 55.23 
Training budget 2,728 39.80 
Contract clauses related to the participation to training activities 1,865 27.21 
Trade unions’ involvement in training provision 2,120 30.93 
Evaluation of training effectiveness (firms that always or almost 
always adopt it)   
Trainees’ satisfaction  4.324 63.08 
Learning achievements  1,974 28.80 
Workers’ performance 3,553 51.84 
Organisational performance 2,007 29.29 
Job-related practices   
Job rotation 1,224 7.91 
Quality circles 461 2.98 
Self-learning 616 3.98 
 
32 
 
Table 2– Pairwise correlations 
Variables empl part-time temp unskilled off_ hrs 
off_ 
part 
on_ 
propens 
job-
related 
practices 
empl 1.00 
       
part-time 0.10 1.00       
temp 0.11 0.34 1.00      
unskilled 0.10 0.20 0.28 1.00     
off-hours  0.83 0.08 0.08 0.07 1.00    
off_part 0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.09 1.00   
on_propens 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.15 1.00  
job-related 
practices 
0.14 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.30 0.71 1.00 
 
Table 3 – Bivariate probit estimate on the probability of providing training  
 On-the-job training Off-the-job training 
size 0.314*** 0.520*** 
 (-0.018) -0.019 
working hours  0.000 -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
labour cost/hour (log) 0.326*** 0.712*** 
 (-0.039) (-0.034) 
females -0.249*** -0.173** 
 (-0.067) (-0.053) 
age  >55 0.397** 0.308** 
 (-0.136) (-0.118) 
age <25 -0.652*** -0.410** 
 (-0.178) (-0.131) 
innovativeness 0.326*** 0.321*** 
 (-0.030) (-0.027) 
job rotation 1.377*** 0.898*** 
 (-0.043) (-0.049) 
quality circles 0.797*** 1.068*** 
 (-0.073) (-0.104) 
self-learning 0.702*** 1.2901*** 
 (-0.067) (-0.113) 
_cons -5.165*** -8.522*** 
 (-0.384) (-0.332) 
athrho  0.690*** 
  (-0.022) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes 
N  15470 
chi2  4501.9378 
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Table 4 Determinants of off-the job training intensity (OLS estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
part time -0.142** -0.156*** -0.080** -0.091** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.037) (0.036) 
temporary workers 0.07* 0.063 0.038 0.033 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.035) (0.034) 
immigrants -0.295*** -0.288*** -0.241*** -0.237*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.034) (0.034) 
training cost/ hour (log) -0.789*** -0.779*** -0.790*** -0.786*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.035) (0.035) 
size -0.110*** -0.144*** -0.174*** -0.197*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.020) (0.020) 
unskilled 0.153* 0.126 0.006 -0.014 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.037) (0.036) 
labour cost/hour (log) 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
age >55 -1.307*** -1.287*** -0.895*** -0.882*** 
 (0.283) -0.279 -0.184 -0.182 
age <25 0.104 0.09 0.123 0.119 
 (0.257) -0.254 -0.169 -0.169 
females -0.249* -0.202 -0.309*** -0.289*** 
 (0.124) -0.122 -0.081 -0.081 
innovativeness 0.276*** 0.210*** 0.219*** 0.175*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.033) (0.033) 
job rotation  0.280***  0.194*** 
  (0.064)  -0.041 
quality circles  0.434***  0.232*** 
  (-0.100)  -0.056 
self learning  0.632***  0.529*** 
  (0.086)  -0.05 
training plan   0.330*** 0.311*** 
   (0.037) (0.037) 
training budget   0.360*** 0.345*** 
   (0.039) (0.039) 
workers' satisfaction   0.047** 0.039*   
   (0.016) (0.016) 
learning achievements   0.076*** 0.066*** 
   (0.017) (0.016) 
trainees’ performance   0.015 0.012 
   (0.016) (0.016) 
training  clauses    -0.016 -0.019 
   (0.037) (0.036) 
trade unions involvement   -0.078* -0.083*   
   (0.034) (0.034) 
_cons 4.559*** 4.491*** 4.183*** 4.205*** 
 (0.222) (0.219) (0.144) (0.142) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 
R2 0.162 0.188 0.242 0.261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 Determinants of off-the job training intensity (Tobit estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
Hours/employee 
(log) 
part time -0.114* -0.129* -0.105 -0.118* 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
temporary workers 0.073 0.07 0.049 0.049 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) 
immigrants -0.279*** -0.272*** -0.246*** -0.240*** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) 
training cost/ hour (log) -0.790*** -0.781*** -0.801*** -0.794*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
size 0.059 0.052 0.035 0.03 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.063) (0.062) 
unskilled 0.161* 0.132* 0.138* 0.119 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.062) (0.062) 
labour cost/hour (log) 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
age >55 -1.157*** -1.146*** -1.077*** -1.074*** 
 (0.281) (0.277) -0.277 -0.275 
age <25 0.145 0.120 0.206 0.189 
 (0.263) (0.258) -0.235 -0.235 
females -0.154 -0.113 -0.144 -0.113 
 (0.128) (0.126) (0.119) (0.119) 
innovativeness 0.283*** 0.218*** 0.234*** 0.189*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) 
job rotation  0.291***  0.206*** 
  (0.064)  (0.062) 
quality circles  0.432***  0.326*** 
  (0.098)  (0.094) 
self learning  0.613***  0.523*** 
  (0.086)  (0.082) 
training plan   0.363*** 0.333*** 
   (0.055) (0.055) 
training budget   0.274*** 0.269*** 
   (0.061) (0.060) 
workers' satisfaction   0.021 0.019 
   (0.023) (0.023) 
learning achievements   0.064* 0.056* 
   (0.025) (0.025) 
trainees’ performance   0.056* 0.046* 
   (0.024) (0.024) 
training  clauses    -0.145* -0.143* 
   (0.058) (0.057) 
trade unions involvement   -0.103 -0.107* 
   (0.054) (0.053) 
_cons 4.278*** 4.315*** 4.234*** 4.283*** 
 (0.311) (0.309) (0.307) (0.306) 
sigma  1.170*** 1.152*** 1.127*** 1.116*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5914 5914 5914 5914 
Pseudo-R2 0.0429 0.0522 0.0641 0.0703 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6– Propensity to provide on-the-job training (HeckProbit estimates – marginal effects) 
 ontrain ontrain ontrain ontrain 
part time 0.0128 0.0065 0.0167 0.0085 
 (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0245) 
temporary workers 0.0201 0.0199 0.0076 0.0104 
 (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0232) 
immigrants 0.0215 0.0196 0.0255 0.0234 
 
(0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
training cost/ hour (log) -0.0362 -0.0290 -0.0357 -0.0300 
 
(0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0228) (0.0230) 
size 0.0418** 0.0397* 0.0304 0.0324 
 (0.0512) (0.0203) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
unskilled 0.0455* 0.0257 0.0367 0.0210 
 
(0.0260) (0.0267) (0.0264) (0.0266) 
labour cost/hour (log) -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0009 
 (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
workers aged >55 -0.2312 -0.2146 -0.2283 -0.2056 
 (0.1404) (0.1431) (0.1450) (0.1455) 
workers aged <25 -0.0741 -0.1188 -0.0554 -0.0991 
 (0.3132) (0.1187) (0.1191) (0.1150) 
females -0.1732*** -0.1761*** -0.1714*** -0.1742*** 
 
(0.0589) (0.0566) (0.0574) (0.0555) 
innovativeness 0.0990*** 0.0729*** 0.0871*** 0.0669*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0260) (0.0251) 
job rotation  0.4328***  0.3933*** 
  (0.0301)  (0.0328) 
quality circles  0.1866***  0.1429*** 
  (0.0411)  (0.0394) 
self learning  0.1621***  0.1304*** 
  
(0.0418)  (0.0408) 
training plan   0.1693*** 0.1482*** 
   (0.0243) (0.0250) 
training budget   -0.0208 -0.0186 
   (0.0259) (0.0259) 
workers' satisfaction   -0.0009 0.0018 
   (0.0106) (0.0107) 
learning achievements   0.0331*** 0.0276** 
   (0.0109) (0.0113) 
trainees’ performance   0.0687*** 0.0557*** 
   (0.0108) (0.0109) 
training  clauses   -0.0506* -0.0543** 
   (0.0272) (0.0276) 
trade unions involvement   0.0008 -0.0110 
  
 (0.0242) (0.0238) 
_cons 0.2411 -0.115 -0.4013 -0.6556* 
 (0.3203) (0.3548) (0.3531) (0.3772) 
athrho -0.3920*** -0.2868* -0.3058** -0.2048 
 
(0.146) (0.1589) (0.150) (0.1589) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14884 14884 14884 14884 
chi2 90.11 317.97 224.13 418.85 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7 – On-the-job training propensity scores of temporary, part-time and unskilled workers  
Variable  N ATT s.e. t-stat 
Unskilled      
 Treated 1833 0.0430 0.0133 2.96 
 Controls 4102    
Temporary      
 Treated 2400 0.0166 0.0187 0.89 
 Controls 3586    
Part-time      
 Treated 1867 0.0065 0.0216 0.3 
 Controls 4119    
Propensity scores are estimated through a logistic function by using a kernel matching algorithm. The function includes 
the covariates reported in Table 8 as controls 
 
 
Table 8 – Quality of matching procedure. Treatment: Presence of unskilled workers 
 
Mean 
 
T test 
 
Variable Treated Control %bias t p>|t| V(T)/V(C) 
immigrants 0.66067 0.65869 0.4 0.13 0.9 . 
size 1.9645 1.9402 3.1 0.9 0.369 0.98 
part-time 0.8287 0.82278 1.4 0.47 0.637 . 
temporary 0.80306 0.78904 3.1 1.05 0.292 . 
training cost/ 
hour (log) 52.333 52.077 0.8 0.25 0.806 1.07 
labour costs 36090 35871 1.4 0.47 0.638 1.13* 
males 0.42171 0.43382 2.5 0.74 0.459 . 
construction 0.21331 0.2252 2.9 0.87 0.385 . 
retail 0.13257 0.12801 1.3 0.41 0.682 . 
finance 0.05019 0.04495 2 0.75 0.456 . 
age >55 0.27778 0.27325 1.9 0.6 0.551 1.07 
age <25 0.06401 0.06508 1.2 0.37 0.714 0.91* 
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Table 9 - Determinants of off-the job training variety 
 ginicont ginicont ginicont 
part time -0.015 -0.012 -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
temporary workers -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.039*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
immigrants -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
training cost/ hour (log) 0.010 0.008 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
size (0.101)*** -0.094*** -0.081*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
unskilled -0.013 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age >55 0.149* 0.142* 0.137* 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) 
Age <25 0.167** 0.173** 0.153** 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.052) 
females 0.04 0.033 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
innovativeness -0.054*** -0.040*** -0.043*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
job rotation  -0.081***  
  (0.016)  
quality circles  -0.095***  
  (0.021)  
self learning  -0.068***  
  (0.019)  
training plan   -0.086*** 
   (0.013) 
training budget   -0.027 
   (0.014) 
workers' satisfaction   -0.006 
   (0.005) 
learning achievements   -0.006 
   (0.006) 
trainees’ performance   -0.009 
   (0.006) 
training  clauses    0.006 
   (0.014) 
trade unions involvement   0.006 
   (0.012) 
_cons 0.827*** 0.841*** 0.873*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 5986 5986 5986 
R2 0.114 0.135 0.156 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 10 – Determinants of the number of job-related practices  (zero-inflated Poisson regression) – marginal 
effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 agg_jbp agg_jbp agg_jbp 
part time 0.126** 0.132*** 0.131*** 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.035) 
temporary  0.056 0.038 0.039 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
immigrants -0.042 -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
training cost/ hour (log) -0.048 -0.033 -0.034 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
size 0.100** 0.067*** 0.073*** 
 (0.049) (0.017) (0.018) 
unskilled 0.149*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
labour cost/hour (log) 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age  >55 -0.400 -0.254 -0.246 
 (0.362) (0.260) (0.261) 
age <25 0.053 0.075 0.060 
 (0.189) (0.205) (0.200) 
females -0.114 -0.055 -0.059 
 (0.123) (0.076) (0.075) 
innovativeness 0.345*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) 
training plan 
 
0.295*** 0.299*** 
 
 
(0.037) (0.036) 
training budget 
 
0.085* 0.086 
 
 
(0.037) (0.035) 
workers’ satisfaction 
 
0.055*** 0.056 
 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
learning achievements 
 
0.041** 0.042 
 
 
(0.015) (0.014) 
workers’ performance 
 
0.070*** 0.070 
 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
contract clauses  
  
-0.046 
 
  
(0.032) 
trade unions  
  
-0.009 
 
  
(0.029) 
_cons -0.183 -0.663*** -0.673*** 
 (0.207) (0.148) (0.136) 
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 5914.000 5914.000 5914.000 
chi2 476.372 765.332 783.332 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
 
